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Abstract—Social awareness and social ties are becoming
increasingly fashionable with emerging mobile and handheld
devices. Social trust degree describing the strength of the
social ties has drawn lots of research interests in many
fields including secure cooperative communications. Such trust
degree reflects the users’ willingness for cooperation, which
impacts the selection of the cooperative users in the practical
networks. In this paper, we propose a cooperative relay and
jamming selection scheme to secure communication based on
the social trust degree under a stochastic geometry framework.
We aim to analyze the involved secrecy outage probability
(SOP) of the system’s performance. To achieve this target,
we propose a double Gamma ratio (DGR) approach through
Gamma approximation. Based on this, the SOP is tractably
obtained in closed form. The simulation results verify our
theoretical findings, and validate that the social trust degree
has dramatic influences on the network’s secrecy performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, social ties have brought extensive influences
among humankind. More and more people are actively
involved in online social interactions [1], hence social ties
among people are extensively broadened and significantly
enhanced [2]. The so-called social ties are usually defined as
the social relationships between individuals [3], such as kin-
ship, colleague relationships, friendship, acquaintance and
so on [4]. The social trust degrees of the social ties among
friends are the most basic and fundamental notions which
characterize the strength of two individuals relating to each
other [5]. According to [6], ties have specific trust degree
values describing the strength (i.e., from enmity to kinship)
between the users. Moreover, social trust degree has drawn
lots of research interests in various fields including mobile
social networks, secure communications and so on.
Physical layer security (PLS) has drawn considerable at-
tention during the past few years. Wyner’s seminal research
in [7] established a basic theory for the PLS. According
to Wyner’s theory, a positive secrecy capacity exists if the
channel quality of the legitimate receiver is better than
that of the eavesdropper. To protect the confidentiality of
wireless transmissions, various communication technologies
have been proposed, among which the user cooperation
technology has been studied intensively. As indicated by
the survey paper [8], various cooperative beamforming and
jamming schemes have been proposed in [9]–[11]. How-
ever, most of these existing works assume that the relays
or the jammers have been chosen without considering the
social trust degrees. Especially, whether each node should
be chosen as relay or jammer according to the social trust
degree has not been well studied.
The social ties of users reflect their willingness for
sharing resources for safeguarding secrecy transmissions.
In relay selection, the cooperative relay or jamming nodes
should be selected according to their social trust degrees [3].
Recently, the social ties among users have been investigated
in cooperative transmissions for PLS enhancement [12]-
[15]. Zheng et al. [12] studied the secrecy rate and the
secrecy throughput using average source-destination dis-
tance based on social ties. To improve secrecy, Tang et
al. [13] discussed the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
of a source-destination pair through the social tie based
cooperative jamming game. A selection scheme based on
mobility-impacted social interaction is proposed in [14] to
maximize the worst-case secrecy rate in peer-to-peer (P2P)
communications. An optimal cooperative transmission strat-
egy is presented in [15] to maximize the secrecy rate, and
the relays can be potential eavesdroppers according to their
social trust degree. However, in these works, the nodes
cooperate in either relay mode or jammer mode, which
lacking the hybrid modes. The secrecy rate or the SOP
have not been considered in terms of a stochastic geometry
framework.
In this paper, we propose a cooperative relay and jam-
ming scheme to secure wireless cooperation communica-
tions under a stochastic geometry framework. The nodes
are classified into relays and jammers based on their lo-
cations and social trust degrees. We analyze the SOP to
evaluate the systems security performance by applying a
double Gamma ratio (DGR) approach. The DGR approach
based on Gamma approximation facilitates mathematically
tractable analysis and has a high accuracy.
Notations: EA[·] and DA[·] denote the mathematical ex-
pectation and variance with respect to a random variable
A, respectively. CN (µ, σ2) denotes circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance
σ2. exp(1) denotes exponential distribution with mean 1.
A(x, r) ⊂ R2 denotes a bi-dimensional disk centered at x
with radius r. D(L1, L2) ⊂ R2 denotes an annulus centered
with internal radius L1 and external radius L2.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless network
over a finite circle area A(o, L2) ⊂ R2. This network
consists of one source s, one destination d, one eaves-
dropper z, and a lot of legitimate nodes. Each node in the
network works in a half-duplex mode and is equipped with
a single antenna. The source hopes to transmit confidential
signals to the destination without being wiretapped by the
eavesdropper. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the source s is located at the origin (0, 0). The signal
suffers from both small-scale fading and large-scale path
loss. The channel between two nodes x1 and x2 is modeled
as Hx1,x2d
−α/2
x1,x2 , where Hx1,x2 ∼ CN (0, 1) is the quasi-
static small-scale fading following the Rayleigh distribution,
d
−α/2
x1,x2 is the large-scale fading characterized by the standard
path loss model ‖x1−x2‖−α/2 with α > 2 being the path-
loss exponent [16].
A. Social Trust Degree Based Nodes Classification
The locations of the legitimate nodes are modeled as a
homogeneous poisson point process (PPP) Φ with density
λ. We assume that the social trust degree of each legitimate
node is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and
modeled as a uniform random variable C distributed in [0, 1]
as in [6],[15]-[18]. For a legitimate node, the trust degree is
an increasing function of C, i.e., the source trusts the node
more when C increases.
We classify the legitimate nodes into relays, jammers and
dummy nodes according to their locations as well as social
trust degrees of the source. The relays are the nodes whose
trust degrees are in [C1, 1] and are located within A(o, L1).
The trust degrees of the jammers are in [C2, C1] and they
located within D(L1, L2). Those nodes with trust degrees in
[0, C2] are dummy nodes. According to the properties of the
PPPs [19], the locations of the relays and the jammers are
characterized by two independent and homogeneous PPPs
denoted by ΦR and ΦJ with densities λR = (1−C1)λ and
λJ = (C1 − C2)λ, respectively. Throughout this paper, we
use xR ∈ ΦR to denote the relays, and xJ ∈ ΦJ to denote
the jammers.
B. Cooperative Secrecy Transmission
We assume all the relays work in the decode-and-forward
(DF) mode with a two-phase transmission protocol. Dur-
ing the first phase of cooperative secrecy communication,
source s broadcasts confidential signal to the relays. We
assume that the confidential information can be transmitted
securely in this phase, which is due to the following two
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Fig. 1: Network model.
reasons: 1) the source transmits with a sufficiently low
power, such that the signal can not be decoded correctly
by the eavesdropper outside A(o, L1) due to the large-
scale pass loss; 2) since C1 is a sufficiently large threshold,
the relays are the most trust nodes so that they will not
leak the information to the eavesdropper. In this phase,
we assume that the relays can always decode the received
confidential information correctly, and the jammers keep
silence. During the second phase, the relays forward the
information to the destination. Since the destination is far
away from the relays, the risk of being wiretapped is large.
To safeguard the security, the jammers transmit jamming
signals concurrently. In order to protect the destination from
being jammed, we set a protected zone A(d, LG) [20].1 The
jammers within this zone will keep silence at this phase.
The dummy nodes will not take part in the confidential
transmission in both the two phases.
C. Signal Model
We consider a cooperative beamforming scheme, where
each relay transmits signal s by pre-compensating the phase
of the channel HxR,y . The transmitted symbol of each relay
node is denoted as sxR =
√
PsH
∗
xR,d
‖HxR,d‖
s, where Ps is the
transmission power of the relay, s is complex Gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and the power of s is unitary i.e.,
E{|s|2} = 1. Note that, such a cooperative beamforming
scheme is a distributed one in the sense that each relay
performs the cooperation with its own channel state infor-
mation (CSI) instead of the global CSI. Consequently, the
network overhead is greatly reduced.
1 The destination node d first broadcasts a pre-designed pilot signal
with a pre-designed power. If a jammer receives the pilot signal, it is in
the protect zone and it will not transmit jamming signals.
Accordingly, the received signal at the destination d is
given by
Sd(d) =
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PsHxR,dH
∗
xR,d
‖HxR,d‖
d
−α/2
xR,d
· s
=
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
Ps‖HxR,d‖d−α/2xR,d · s. (1)
Similarly, the signal received by the eavesdropper is given
by
S(z) =
∑
xR∈ΦR
√
PsHxR,zH
∗
xR,d
‖HxR,d‖
d−α/2xR,z · s. (2)
In order to enhance the security, the jammers also trans-
mit independent Gaussian distributed interference signals to
confuse the eavesdropper. Since the jamming signals from
different jammers are independent, the aggregate jamming
power received at the destination d and the eavesdropper z
are given by
Id(d) =
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,dd
−α
xJ ,d
(3)
and
I(z) =
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z, (4)
respectively, where Pj is the transmission power of each
jammer, D denotes the area ΦJ\A(d, LG), and hx1,x2 ∼
exp(1) is the power fading between locations x1 and x2. For
analytical tractability, we focus on the interference-limited
regime and ignore the noise at the receiver. The signal-to-
interference ratio (SIR) at destination d is given by
SIRd =
∣∣∣∑xR∈ΦR √Ps‖HxR,d‖d−α/2xR,d
∣∣∣2∑
xJ∈D PjhxJ ,dd
−α
xJ ,d
, (5)
and the SIR for eavesdropper located at z is given by
SIRz =
∣∣∣∣∑xR∈ΦR
√
PsHxR,zH
∗
xR,d
‖HxR,d‖
d
−α/2
xR,z
∣∣∣∣
2
∑
xJ∈D PjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z
. (6)
D. Performance Metric
We use the SOP as a metric to evaluate the system secrecy
performance. The SOP is defined as the probability that the
SIR achieved by the single eavesdropper is larger than some
threshold (i.e., the target SIR) βe [21]. Therefore, the SOP
is given by
Pso = P {SIRz > βe} = 1− P
{
T (z)
I(z)
≤ βe
}
, (7)
where T (z) =
∣∣∣∣∑xR∈ΦR
√
PsHxR,zH
∗
xR,d
‖HxR,d‖
d
−α/2
xR,z
∣∣∣∣
2
,
HxR,zH
∗
xR,d
‖HxR,d‖
d
−α/2
xR,z ∼ CN (0, d−αxR,z) which is independent
for arbitrary xR ∈ ΦR. Although T (z) is conditional
exponential distributed with conditional mean
Ps
∑
xR∈ΦR d
−α
xR,z , the mean is related to the locations
of xR in ΦR. This makes it untractable to calculate
the probability in (7) through common ways. Also it is
complicated to derive the probability distribution function
(PDF) of I(z).
In order to obtain a closed form expression of the SOP,
we propose a DGR approach to make (7) mathematically
tractable, which will be discussed in Section III.
III. DGR APPROACH FOR CALCULATING SOP
In this paper, we aim to analyze the SOP in our con-
sidered network according to (7). However, in our scheme,
it is complicated to derive the PDFs of T (z) and I(z).
To tackle this problem, we propose the following DGR
approach, which will facilitate our calculations.
In order to describe the DGR approach, we primarily
introduce the Gamma approximation. The Gamma approx-
imation is an approach to approximate the distribution of
a random variable based on the Gamma distribution [22].
By employing the Gamma approximation, the PDFs of T (z)
and I(z) can be easily obtained. The Gamma approximated
PDF of a random variable A is given as
GA(xA; νA, θA) =
xνA−1A e
− xA
θA
θνAA Γ(νA)
, (8)
where Γ(νA) is the Gamma function [23, eq(6.45)], and the
parameters νA and θA are derived from matching the first
and second order moments of A. The i-th cumulants N
(i)
A
of variable A is defined as
N
(i)
A =
diEA [e
wa]
dwi
∣∣∣
w=0
. (9)
The mean of A is thereby denoted as µA = N
(1)
A , and
the variance of A is given by σ2A = N
(2)
A −
(
N
(1)
A
)2
.
Accordingly, the approximated Gamma variable has the
parameters
νA =
µ2A
σ2A
, θA =
σ2A
µA
. (10)
According to (8)-(10), we can obtain the approximated
PDFs GT (xT ; νT , θT ) andGI(xI ; νI , θI) for T (z) and I(z)
in our network model, respectively. Firstly, we derive the
parameters νT , θI , νI , and θI as
νT =
λRQz(1)
λRQ2z(1) + 2Qz(2)
, θT =
Ps[λRQ
2
z(1) + 2Qz(2)]
Qz(1)
,
(11)
νI =
λJ
( ∫
D
1
dαxJ ,z
dxJ
)2
2
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,z
dxJ
, θI =
2Pj
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,z
dxJ∫
D
1
dαxJ ,z
dxJ
,
(12)
where Qz(n) =
∫
A(o,L1) d
−nα
xR,zdxR. Due to the conditional
exponential distribution of T (z) and the space limitation,
we only provide the derivation details of (12) in Appendix
A. Then the approximated PDFs of T (z) and I(z) are given
by
GT (xT ; νT , θT ) =
xνT−1T e
−xT /θT
θνTT Γ(νT )
, (13)
and
GI(xI ; νI , θI) =
xνI−1I e
−xI/θI
θνII Γ(νI)
, (14)
respectively.
After obtaining the approximated PDFs GT (xT ; νT , θT )
and GI(xI ; νI , θI), our objective SOP in (7) is giving in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (The DGR Approach): The SOP derived
from the ratio of two approximated Gamma variables is
given by
Pso = q
νT
e Γ(νT + νI)
νI(qe + 1)νT+νIΓ(νT )Γ(νI)
· F, (15)
where qe =
βeθI
θT
, F = 2F1
(
1, νT + νI ; νI + 1;
1
qe+1
)
with
2F1 being hypergeometric function [23, Eq. 6.455.1].
Proof 1: According to the formulation of Pso in (7)
P
{
T (z)
I(z)
≤ βe
}
= P {T (z) ≤ βeI(z)}
(a)
= EI(z)
[∫ βeI
0
GT (xT ; νT , θT )dxT
]
(b)
=
∫ ∞
0

1− Γ
(
νT ,
βeI
θT
)
Γ(νT )

GI(xI ; νI , θI)dxI
(c)
= 1− q
νT
e Γ(νT + νI)
νI(qe + 1)νT+νIΓ(νT )Γ(νI)
· F,
where (a) follows from the total probability formulation,
(b) follows from the definition of the incomplete Gamma
function [23, Eq. 6.45] and the approximated PDF of I(z).
After some integral calculations, (c) follows from applying
[23, Eq. 6.455.1]. Consequently,
Pso = 1− P
{
T (z)
I(z)
≤ βe
}
=
qνTe Γ(νT + νI)
νI(qe + 1)νT+νIΓ(νT )Γ(νI)
· F.
Fig. 2 depicts the theoretical result in Proposition 1 and
the simulation result of the SOP, where dE denotes the
distance between the origin and the eavesdropper. We can
see from Fig. 2 that the proposed DGR approach has high
accuracy.
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Fig. 2: SOP vs. different distances dE of the eavesdropper. The system
parameters are βe = 0 dB, α = 4, L1 = 6 m, L2 = 100 m, LG = 5 m,
C1 = 0.8, C2 = 0.79, λ = 0.2 /m2, Ps = 10 dBm, and Pj = 1 dBm.
−20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15 20
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
threshold β
e
/dB
Se
cr
ec
y 
O
ut
ag
e 
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
C1=0.9, dE =20 m
C1=0.8, dE =20 m
C1=0.7, dE =20 m
C1=0.9, dE =60 m
C1=0.8, dE =60 m
C1=0.7, dE =60 m
Fig. 3: SOP of single eavesdropper vs. βe for various social trust degree
C1 and distances dE of the eavesdropper.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, representative numerical results are pre-
sented to illustrate the SOP performance in our network
model. Considering the accuracy of the DGR approach and
also for simplicity, we only present the numerical results
based on Proposition 1. As the legitimate nodes in the
network are classified into relays and jammers according
to their social trust degrees of the source, the density λR of
the relays and the density λJ of the jammers are determined
by (1 − C1)λ and Cqλ, respectively, where Cq denotes
(C1 −C2). We mainly focus on the impacts of C1 and Cq
on the SOP. The other system parameters as set as follows:
the fading power exponent is α = 4, the border of A(0, L1)
is L1 = 6 m, the outer border of D(L1, L2) is L2 = 100 m,
the radius of the protected zone is LG = 5 m, the density
of the legitimate nodes is λ = 0.2 /m2, the transmission
power of the relay is Ps = 10 dBm, and the transmission
power of the jammer is Pj = 1 dBm.
Fig. 3 plots the SOP versus βe for various social trust
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Fig. 4: SOP of single eavesdropper vs. βe for various Cq and dE .
degrees C1 of the source and distances dE of the eaves-
dropper. Comparing the curves with the same dE , we see
that as C1 increases, the SOP decreases. This is because a
larger C1 is equivalent to a smaller λR, which results in less
relays producing lower SIRE . Therefore, there is a higher
probability for performing perfect secrecy, which leads to
a lower SOP. We also see that the SOP decreases with
increasing dE by the comparison among the curves with
the same C1. This is due to the fact that the secrecy outage
occurs more frequently when the distance between the
source and the eavesdropper decreases. Since C1 represents
the trust degree of the source, we know that the most
private message should be transmitted to the person with
sufficiently high trust degree in order to realize perfect
secrecy.
Fig. 4 compares the SOP versus βe for various Cq and
dE , where C1 is set as 0.8. By comparing the curves
with the same dE , we see that as Cq increases, the SOP
decreases. This is because a larger Cq is equivalent to
a larger λJ , which results in more jammers producing
lower SIRE . We also observe that the SOP dramatically
decreases with increasing dE . As Cq derived from (C1−C2)
determines the density of the jammers, smaller C2 will
lead to more jammers offering intentional interference to
improve the secrecy performance. From this we know that a
diminishing social trust degree will disrupt the eavesdropper
more efficiently.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a cooperative relay and
jamming scheme based on social trust degree to secure com-
munications. In order to facilitate the analysis of the SOP,
we proposed a DGR approach under a stochastic geometry
framework. The simulation results have high accuracy and
show that the social ties have dramatic influences on the
system’s secrecy performance. The proposed scheme has
considered a practical scene in which the social trust degree
is employed to reflect the users’ willingness of cooperation.
For further researches, we will study the COP and the
secrecy throughput in the scheme, and consider the social
trust degree further practically.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION DETAILS OF (12)
According to (9) and the definition of I(z) in (4), the
i-th cumulants of I(z) is given by
N
(i)
I =
diEΦJ ,hxJ ,z
[
e
w
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z
]
dwi
∣∣∣
w=0
. (16)
First, we calculate EΦJ ,hxJ ,z
[
ew
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z
]
as
EΦJ ,hxJ,z
[
e
w
∑
xJ∈D
PjhxJ,zd
−α
xJ,z
]
= EΦJ ,hxJ ,z
[ ∏
xJ∈D
ewPjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ,z
]
(d)
= EΦJ
[ ∏
xJ∈D
EhxJ ,z
[
ewPjhxJ ,zd
−α
xJ ,z
] ]
(e)
= EΦJ
[ ∏
xJ∈D
1
1− wPjd−αxJ ,z
]
(f)
= exp
[
− λJ
∫
D
(
1− 1
1− wPjd−αxJ ,z
)
dxJ
]
= exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,z − wPj
dxJ
)
, (17)
where (d) follows since hxJ ,z is independent of ΦJ . (e) fol-
lows from hxJ ,z ∼ exp(1), and by applying the probability
generating functional (PGFL) of the PPP we can obtain (f).
Consequently, substituting (17) into (16), N
(1)
I is given by
N
(1)
I =
d
(
exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,z
−wPj dxJ
))
dw
∣∣∣
w=0
= exp (λJG1) · λJPjG2(2)
∣∣
w=0
= λJ
∫
D
Pj
dαxJ ,z
dxJ , (18)
where G1 =
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,z
−wPj dxJ , G2(n) =∫
D
dαxJ,z
(dαxJ ,z−wPj)
n dxJ . Let i = 2, N
(2)
I is given as
N
(2)
I =
d2
(
exp
(
λJ
∫
D
wPj
dαxJ ,z
−wPj dxJ
))
dw2
∣∣∣
w=0
(g)
= λJP
2
j exp (λJG1) ·
[
λJG
2
2(2) + 2G2(3)
] ∣∣
w=0
= λ2J
(∫
D
Pj
dαxJ ,z
dxJ
)2
+ 2λJ
∫
D
P 2j
d2αxJ ,z
dxJ , (19)
where (g) is the second-order differential results. As a
result, by substituting (18) and (19), σ2I is given by
σ2I = N
(2)
I −
(
N
(1)
I
)2
= 2λJ
∫
D
P 2j
d2αxJ ,z
dxJ . (20)
According to (10), νI and θI are obtained as
νI =
λJ
( ∫
D
1
dαxJ ,z
dxJ
)2
2
∫
D
1
d2αxJ ,z
dxJ
(21)
and
θI =
2Pj
∫
D
1
d2αxJ,z
dxJ∫
D
1
dαxJ,z
dxJ
, (22)
respectively.
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